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Abstract
2001 was a landmark year for China, who finally gained accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO,
2011) after 15 years of negotiations. China’s accession to the WTO has helped both the Chinese and the
world economy. China’s accession resulted in astounding growth of exports, and a reduction in tariffs both on
imports into China and tariffs placed on Chinese products. A burgeoning export market and looser
investment restrictions led to growth in Chinese capital. The accession requirements placed upon China
brought the nation into a period of greater trade liberalization, weakened state-run enterprises, and giving
more power to private interests. The WTO accession agreements also caused China to make international
trade law more transparent and even. Other nations have benefited from more access to Chinese markets and
vice versa.
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 2001 was a landmark year for China, 
who finally gained accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO, 2011) after 15 years 
of negotiations.  The WTO is a multilateral trade 
organization whose purpose is to help trade flow 
freely while preventing negative side effects, as 
well as to serve as a place for settling international 
trade disputes and negotiations through unbiased 
legal procedures.  The WTO was formed from the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
which was signed by 23 nations in 1947 (Fung, 
2006).  One of the original contracting nations 
was China.  One of the GATT’s main topics was 
the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause, which 
gave fellow contracting nations the exact same 
treatment as other contracting nations, meaning 
no single country could gain an advantage 
through lighter customs rates or lower tariffs.  One 
fault of the GATT, however, was that it lacked 
any mechanism for enforcing cooperation or 
negotiation.  In 1949, only 2 years after signing the 
GATT, the Chinese nationalist government located 
in Taiwan withdrew China’s membership from the 
GATT (Fung, 2006).  30 years later in 1979, however, 
China entered a period of trade liberalization, 
though the Open Door Policy (Bhatt, 2004).  In 
1986, China submitted an application to the GATT 
to resume their status as a contracting party, and 
negotiations started (Fung, 2006).  In 1995, the 
GATT changed its policies and renamed itself the 
WTO (Bhatt, 2004).  Upon formation of the WTO, 
China requested the conversion of its status as 
Working Party to Full Membership.  In 2001, after 15 
years in total of ongoing negotiations, China was 
unanimously voted into the WTO (Fung, 2006). 
Today the WTO consists of 153 member nations 
and is one of the largest trade organizations in the 
world.
 China’s accession to the WTO has helped 
both the Chinese and the world economy. 
China’s accession resulted in astounding growth 
of exports, and a reduction in tariffs both on 
imports into China and tariffs placed on Chinese 
products.  A burgeoning export market and looser 
investment restrictions led to growth in Chinese 
capital.  The accession requirements placed 
upon China brought the nation into a period of 
greater trade liberalization, weakened state-run 
enterprises, and giving more power to private 
interests.  The WTO accession agreements also 
caused China to make international trade law 
more transparent and even.  Other nations have 
benefited from more access to Chinese markets 
and vice versa.
 WTO accession has led to an increase in 
Chinese exports, resulting in greater economic 
growth.  Accession to the WTO gave China better 
market access to its 152 WTO trade partners (Bhatt, 
2004).  The MFN clause of the WTO agreements 
helps prevent discrimination against Chinese 
exports in other WTO nations (WTO, 2011).  Greater 
foreign market access created a surge in the 
export of Chinese products.  From 2002 to 2007, 
net exports as a share of GDP in China increased 
from 2.6% to 7.7% (Chen, 2009).  By 2010, China’s 
current account balance was $305 billion (Google 
public data, IMF).  China’s exports have primarily 
been labor-intensive manufactured goods due to 
China’s abundance of inexpensive labor (Chen, 
2009).  This focus on labor-intensive manufacturing 
shifted workers away from the primary sector 
towards the secondary sector (Marti, 2011).  The 
percentage of workers employed in agriculture 
decreased from 50% in 2001 to 11.2% in 2010 (World 
Bank, 2011).  Furthermore, the percent of GDP that 
is attributed to the primary sector decreased from 
23.5% in 1994 to 11.7% in 2006 (Marti, 2011).  As 
more labor-intensive products are manufactured, 
there is a greater demand for labor to continue 
production.  This higher demand resulted in 
rising real wages in China across industries.  From 
2001 to 2006 real annual wages across industries 
doubled from 12,000 yuan on average to 24,000 
yuan, in terms of 2007 yuan (Yang, 2010).  This 
increase in real wages was not limited to the 
Chinese upper class. It included typically low-
wage industries such as manufacturing and retail. 
China’s export market also greatly benefited from 
increased foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows 
due to accession.  In the early 1990s, FDI inflows 
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into China were large, but stagnated by the end 
of the decade.  This stagnation was attributed 
to restrictions on FDI, government corruption, 
and inefficient state-owned enterprises (Chen, 
2009).  Accession to the WTO, however, reduced 
restrictions on FDI in China, resulting in a new 
surge in FDI inflows to China. From 2001 to 2002 
alone FDI inflows increase 30% (Fung, 2006).  The 
growth of FDI has been shown to help accelerate 
export growth (Chen, 2009 Zeng, 2010).  Foreign-
invested firms (FIFs) are some of the largest 
exporters in China, with their processed exports 
totaling 45% of Chinese exports.  FDI also helps 
stimulate employment.  Between 2001 and 
2006 FIFs provided an additional 11 million jobs 
in China (Chen, 2009).  The greater access of 
foreign markets for Chinese exports as well as the 
increased FDI inflows brought by WTO accession 
has greatly benefited the Chinese economy.
 Tariff reduction policies required for WTO 
accession were introduced to China to benefit 
both foreign and domestic enterprises.  As 
stated above, the MFN status of the WTO helps 
China’s export industries (Bhatt, 2004).  MFN status 
allows China to face the same trade barriers as 
competitors, allowing China to compete with 
other nations fairly.  These measures are not 
entirely sudden. Discriminatory measures taken 
by other nations against China were phased out 
as specified in Annex 7 of the Protocol (roughly 
five years since accession for most measures) 
(Cheong, 2003).  These phasing-out periods 
allowed time for foreign markets to adjust to trade 
without a sudden flood of cheap Chinese exports. 
Furthermore, reduction of China’s domestic 
tariffs reduced efficiency loss brought about by 
the misallocation of resources.  Reductions in 
tariffs also lowered prices for consumers while 
helping foreign producers by reducing costs and 
providing greater market access.  In addition to 
removing tariffs, China agreed to limit the non-
tariff measures they utilize only to those listed in 
Annex 3 of the Protocol, many of which have a 
scheduled date to end (Cheong, 2003).  China 
also agreed to remove performance, trade 
balancing, foreign exchange balancing, and 
prior experience requirements, in order to grant 
permissions to invest, import licenses, quotas and 
tariff rates regardless of existing domestic demand 
(Cheong, 2003).  China’s accession agreements 
allowed for the continued use of some forms of 
trade barriers, but these barriers were temporary 
measures to slowly introduce Chinese trade to 
the world economy.  China has agreed not only 
to remove tariffs, but is also now responsible for 
preventing the formation of non-tariff barriers to 
trade regardless of foreign competition. 
 The growth of the Chinese export economy 
and FDI inflows resulted in the growth of domestic 
Chinese capital.  Since accession to the WTO, 
average capital stock growth rates have risen, 
a change from the decreasing growth rates of 
1998-2001 (Chen, 2009).  The increase in FDI since 
accession also helped the development of capital 
by acting as a vehicle for technology transfer. 
Regions that receive FDI benefited from the 
advanced foreign technology which is brought in 
from investing firms.  Some of the largest attractors 
of FDI are capital-intensive projects (Fung, 2006). 
Thus, the investment brought into China is used 
for the development of capital.  Furthermore, 
FIFs shifted China toward the production of 
high-tech goods (Chen, 2009).  Since accession 
China has gained productive capability in IT 
products (Fung, 2006).  China’s export of high-
tech products rose greatly, with 80% of FIF exports 
in 2004 consisting of high-tech goods (Chen, 
2009).  Between 2000 and 2005 China’s total 
exports of high-tech products increased from 17% 
to 32% (Chen, 2009).  While it might seem to be 
contradictory that China exports capital-intensive 
goods considering that it was established above 
that China is labor-abundant, in this case China 
is exporting both labor-intensive manufactured 
goods as well as high-tech products. The FDI 
investments are therefore causing technology 
transfer and capital growth.  It might seem 
worrisome that if FDI inflows are so large that 
China would encounter the same problems as 
found in maquiladoras in Mexico.  Maquiladoras 
are factories in Mexico wholly owned by foreign 
corporations who utilize the cheap local labor to 
produce items to be imported back to the firm’s 
home country.  Maquiladoras are well-known for 
their underpaid, overworked employees.  China 
avoids this problem due to the gradual decrease 
in FDI limitations.  Initially after accession, foreign 
investors could not control more than 49% of a 
firm, but restrictions on foreign ownership were 
reduced years after accession (Bhatt, 2004).  By 
slowly allowing more foreign investment over time, 
control of fixed capital is predominantly Chinese, 
with 95% of fixed capital in China owned by 
domestic sources (Chen, 2009).  China’s accession 
into the WTO helped the development of capital 
within China through the flow of technology and 
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the development of production methods.
 The WTO accession requirements 
provided an impetus for the Chinese economy 
to enter a period of liberalization.  In order to 
qualify for WTO accession, China has been 
forced to greatly weaken its state-run enterprises 
(SOEs) and allow for greater private competition 
(Cheong, 2003).  State-run enterprises are now 
required to make business decisions based solely 
on commercial considerations (Cheong, 2003). 
SOEs must act as any business would because 
decision-making cannot be changed by the 
political leanings of the Chinese government.  The 
WTO accession allowed for non-state enterprises 
to own a portion of trading rights in agriculture 
(Fung, 2006).  This weakened the grip that SOEs 
have over Chinese agriculture, and brought more 
power to private agricultural trade.  Loosening of 
government control of the economy promoted 
greater efficiency and quality due to increased 
competition.  For example, a liberalized logistics 
sector (transport, warehousing, material handling, 
packaging) led to better infrastructure and lower 
transportation costs (Bhatt, 2004).  Lastly, the push 
for liberalization resulted in the 2001 Trade Union 
Law, which allowed for collective negotiation 
(Fung, 2006).  This law has helped Chinese workers 
by allowing for the formation of labor unions, 
granting employees more power to negotiate 
wages and working conditions.  The push for 
liberalization brought on by China’s accession to 
the WTO has resulted in a shift of economic power 
away from SOEs and toward private interests.
 As a part of the reform required by WTO 
accession, China is responsible for increasing 
transparency of trade information and law. 
Increasing transparency requires not only more 
effective promulgation of existing trade law, 
but also making the inner workings of legislative 
processes more apparent to firms.  Transparency 
is useful for both foreign and domestic firms as it 
allows them to make more informed decisions 
based on government trade law.  China 
succeeded in increasing the publicity of existing 
trade laws.  The WTO TBT-SPS website has been 
set up and contains information concerning 
China’s technical barriers to trade (Chen, 2009). 
Furthermore, the Chinese government regularly 
publishes manuals on Chinese foreign trade, 
which include the printing of laws which may 
be of interest to both domestic and foreign firms 
(Cheong, 2003).  On the legal side, the Chinese 
government has been moving toward reform 
aimed at increasing the balance of Chinese 
law.  For example, the 2004 Administrative 
Licensing Law established the publicity of all 
administrative licenses.  In addition, the 2008 
Opinions Concerning Deepening Reform of 
Administrative Management Mechanisms called 
for administration modes to be transparent and 
standardized (Chen, 2009).  Through the Chinese 
accession, the Chinese government has been 
on the path toward greater transparency and 
balance.
 China was not the only nation to benefit 
from WTO accession.  As stated above, the MFN 
status granted to WTO members allows all countries 
to trade on an even playing field.  This status had 
beneficial effects not only on China’s exports 
abroad, but also on other WTO members’ exports 
to China.  China’s imports now all face the same 
tariffs and barriers to trade, thus making each 
country’s trade with China representative of its 
comparative advantages, not its political power. 
Increased trade with China also benefited its 
fellow developing Asian economies.  Since China 
focuses on labor-intensive manufacturing, it is a 
large market for raw materials that come from the 
other developing Asian economies (Chen, 2009). 
Asia’s newly industrialized economies account 
for 24.59% of all of China’s imports in 2007 (Chen, 
2009).  In 2003 18% of South Korean Exports and 
12% of Japanese exports were sold in China (Fung, 
2006).  China even has a rising trade deficit with 
other Asian economies (Chen, 2009).  China’s role 
as a market for exports contributed to the growth 
of its developing neighbors, just as the US and 
EU’s role as markets for exports contributed to the 
growth of the Chinese economy (Chen, 2009). 
Furthermore, the reduction in barriers to Chinese 
imports resulted in lower prices, which benefited 
the US consumers who purchase the lower-priced 
imports (Fung, 2006).  China’s accession to the 
WTO has brought benefits to both developing 
neighbors as well as its more developed trade 
partners.
 Despite the benefits of China’s accession 
to the WTO, there have been concerns regarding 
possible negative side effects of its accession.  As 
the influx of FDI has increased the growth of capital 
and exports, there has been concern that the 
firms that received FDI have an advantage over 
domestic firms.  Although firms which received 
large amounts of FDI had a productive advantage 
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shortly after the accession, the difference in 
the labor productivity of domestic and FIFs has 
decreased.  In 2001 the labor productivity of FIFs 
across industries was 1.6 times that of domestically 
invested firms.  However, by 2006 FIFs were only 
1.02 times more productive (Chen, 2009).  The 
decrease in labor productivity shows that although 
FIFs once had an advantage, FIFs are no longer 
more productive than domestically invested firms.
 As the Chinese economy booms, foreign 
governments have been worried about the 
undervaluation of the yuan.  While the yuan is 
currently undervalued, sudden revaluation may 
harm China’s growth.  Sudden revaluation is 
expected to greatly reduce the number of China’s 
exports, resulting in massive unemployment, 
specifically in the textiles, clothing, shoemaking, 
toys, motorcycles, and agricultural sectors.  A 
sudden appreciation of 5-10% is estimated to 
cause a loss of 3.5 million non-agricultural jobs 
in China (Chen, 2009).  However, if revaluation 
occurs slowly then there should be less intense 
negative repercussions.  In fact, the yuan 
appreciated 18% from January 2006 to June 2008 
(Chen, 2009).  Immediate revaluation is dangerous 
to the Chinese economy, so China is cautiously 
appreciating the yuan to meet international 
concerns while still avoiding the possible dangers 
to its export markets.
 Although the Chinese economy has seen 
growth in industrial exports, Chinese farmers 
face considerable competition with agricultural 
imports from the US.  Chinese farmers face 
competition with agricultural imports from the US, 
but this competition is only in grains and oilseed-
based products (Fung, 2006).  China actually has 
a comparative advantage in rice, meats and 
horticulture (Bhatt, 2004).  The damage to China’s 
agriculture was further limited by the trade-rate-
quotas (TRQs) that have been temporarily allowed 
to be maintained after accession.  China was 
allowed trade-rate quotas on wheat, rice, corn, 
cotton, soybean products, palm oil and rapeseed 
oil.  Since 2001, these quota levels decreased as 
China’s economy slowly reacted to agricultural 
competition (Fung, 2006).  The approved TRQs that 
China maintained allowed Chinese agriculture to 
slowly adjust to increased foreign competition. 
TRQs restricted structural unemployment in the 
agricultural sector and the limited protection 
allowed Chinese grain producers to maintain 
some measure of competitiveness in the face of 
overwhelming foreign competition (Chen, 2009).
 The growth of cheap Chinese exports has 
undercut the domestic industries of its trading 
partners.  Although increased trade competition 
with China would negatively impact the domestic 
businesses of its trade partners, a number of 
the trade complaints against China come from 
nations who lack comparative advantages in 
manufactured goods.  For example, when US 
antidumping action was taken against Chinese 
furniture imports in 2003, imports of furniture to the 
US from Indonesia, Brazil, Thailand, and Malaysia 
increased dramatically.  The reason for the surge 
in antidumping action taken against China, as 
well as the concern for China’s trade partners, is 
not entirely due to foreign competition issues, but 
from domestic competition issues.  Firms that invest 
and build business connections in China gain a 
supply advantage over the firms that choose to 
pursue imports from other sources.  The domestic 
firms who do not import from China are ultimately 
negatively impacted as they cannot compete 
with their fellow importers’ cheaper goods.  The 
firms that do invest in China, however, benefit as 
these firms gain income from their investments 
into China as the Chinese export market grows, 
and the business connections built by investing 
firms can help create an advantage for investing 
firms (Zeng, 2010).  
 Although China’s accession has caused 
some negative side effects, the consequences 
are limited.  The difference between FIFs and 
domestic firms has decreased, and although the 
yuan is currently undervalued, slow appreciation 
is preventing damage to Chinese export markets. 
Although accession has caused some harm to 
Chinese agriculture, the harm is only limited to 
grains and oilseeds. Instead, China’s use of TRQs 
allowed a ‘soft landing’ for Chinese agriculture. 
The increased disputes with China’s trade partners 
is not necessarily a result of increased competition 
from China, it also represents changing domestic 
competition among importers.
 China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 
brought a number of benefits to both China as 
well as the world.  Reduced barriers to trade and 
larger FDI inflows boosted Chinese export markets. 
Accession resulted in the reduction of tariffs 
and barriers to free trade.  The booming export 
economy and FDI inflows improved the growth of 
capital in China, resulting in a shift toward higher 
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technology.  The accession requirements lessened 
the power of Chinese SOEs, and gave more power 
to private interests within China.  The transparency 
requirements of the WTO accession resulted in 
greater trade law publication and regulations. 
China’s trade partners also benefited.  Other WTO 
members utilized their MFN status to face equal 
trade barriers, and neighboring countries gained 
a large market for raw material exports in China. 
2001 was truly a landmark year for China.
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